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Abstract
We construct a model where wage inequality, intergenerational mobility and the
distribution of skills are all jointly determined in general equilibrium, which is solved
analytically. We show that it is important to treat these variables jointly, as they have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on each other. The model is used to understand both empirical
regularities and policy implications. The main result of the paper is that changes in
education, including public education, lead to a negative correlation between inequality
and upward mobility, while changes in productivity tend to lead to a positive corre-
lation between inequality and upward mobility. Hence, the observations that some
European countries tend to be more equal but less socially mobile than the US cannot
be attributed to diﬀerences in public support to education, but rather to diﬀerences
in productivity. Another result of the paper is that while public support to education
beneﬁts children of poor parents, it beneﬁts children of skilled and rich parents by
even more, improving their relative chances of success. Since parents care about their
children, general public support to education can then increase the diﬀerence in wel-
fare between skilled and non-skilled individuals, notwithstanding a reduction in wage
inequality.
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In recent years, there has been a growing interest among macroeconomists in issues of
inequality, skill distribution and intergenerational mobility. This paper oﬀers an integration
of these economic issues in a uniﬁed theoretical framework. Our theory enables us to
examine the relationships between these variables, their reaction to exogenous changes,
including policy changes, and their implications for individual welfare levels.
The main motivation of this paper is to understand why there exists such substantial
diﬀerences between countries with respect to these variables. Why are some countries more
equal than others, and why are some countries more socially mobile? For example, Checchi,
Ichino and Rustichini (1999) have recently shown that Italy is more equal but less mobile
than the U.S. Bjorklund, Eriksson, Jantti, Raaum and Osterbacka (2001) show that in
addition to being more equal, the Nordic countries are more mobile than the U.S. Dahan
and Gavira (1999) report on large diﬀerences in mobility between Latin American countries.
We believe that a general equilibrium model, where inequality and mobility are jointly and
endogenously determined, can shed light on these stylized facts and on their causes.
Our motivation is not only empirical, but also based on theoretical considerations.
Inequality, mobility, and distribution are strongly related and hence, need to be analyzed
simultaneously. For example, mobility rates aﬀect the distribution of skills. If wages are
endogenous, this aﬀects wages and wage inequality. But inequality also aﬀects mobility,
both as an incentive to upward mobility, and as a constraint on the poor to invest in skill
acquisition. Note that a general equilibrium framework that studies inequality and mobility
jointly is important also for welfare analysis. While people care about their own income,
we should acknowledge that they also care about their children. Hence, mobility aﬀects
individual welfare, as it determines the chances of the individual’s children improving their
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social lot. This will prove to be important when analyzing the eﬀects of various policies
on inequality, mobility and distribution, as it tells us how these policies aﬀect individual
welfare levels. This might also be relevant for the issue of political support for such policies.
Therefore, we believe that a key contribution of this paper is to provide a tractable model,
where generations are linked through an altruistic motive and inequality, mobility and
skill-distribution are determined endogenously.
Let us now describe the main elements of our model. Workers have two levels of human
capital: they are either skilled or non-skilled. This leads to clear deﬁnitions of inequality,
skill distribution and mobility in our model. Wage inequality is deﬁned as the ratio between
wages of skilled and non-skilled workers. Skill distribution is the ratio between the shares
of skilled and non-skilled workers. For intergenerational mobility, we use two measures:
upward mobility and inequality of opportunity. The former is the probability that children
of non-skilled parents become skilled. The latter is the diﬀerence between the probabilities
of becoming skilled for children of skilled and non-skilled parents, respectively.
Skill acquisition is costly. We assume that children cannot borrow against future human
capital, implying that their parents must ﬁnance this cost. Parents diﬀer in income and
hence, in investment in their children’s education, but we also assume that the productivity
of this investment may depend on the parents’ education. In other words, skilled parents
have higher income but they are also more eﬀective in providing education for their children.
They know better what books to buy, what type of tutoring ﬁts the needs of their children,
what additional courses they should take, etc., which gives them an additional edge in
supplying education for their children. Finally, education costs also depend on child inherent
educational aptitude (innate ability), which is stochastic and assumed to be independent
between generations.
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As the main case, we assume individual aptitude to be known to both parent and
child when the educational investment decision is undertaken. The parent allocates income
between education of her child and her own consumption. Thus, there is a threshold level
of aptitude above which children get education, which depends on parental income and
education. The diﬀerent thresholds for skilled and non-skilled parents determine the rates
of mobility in the economy. In addition to the full information case, we also explore other
informational assumptions, such as no information on the child’s aptitude before starting
school. This case is interesting as it creates a conﬂict of interests between parent and child.
While the child wants her parent to pay as much as possible for education, to maximize her
chances of becoming skilled, the parent also cares about her own consumption. We solve
this conﬂict by using asymmetric Nash bargaining. Due to the conﬂict between parents and
children, educational decisions in this case also depends on the relative social bargaining
power of parents versus children.
As mentioned above, investment in education depends on income and hence, on inequal-
ity. We ﬁnd inequality to have two opposite eﬀects on upward mobility. On the one hand,
future inequality creates an incentive to become skilled, and has a positive eﬀect on upward
mobility. We call this the incentive eﬀect. On the other hand, higher inequality reduces the
ability of non-skilled parents to pay for their childrens’ education, since education is usually
provided by skilled workers and its costs are indexed to their wage. This reduces upward
mobility, and we call it the distance eﬀect. We ﬁnd that the incentive eﬀect dominates if
inequality is low, while the distance eﬀect dominates if the economy is very unequal.
After endogenizing education decisions and thus, the distribution of skills, the model
endogenizes wages as a function of the skill distribution, closing the general equilibrium
in the economy. First, we use our model to examine the eﬀect of a skill-biased technical
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change, which raises the productivity of skilled workers by more than that of non-skilled.
We show that it raises inequality, while its eﬀect on upward mobility is ambiguous. If
inequality is low, mobility rises, as the incentive eﬀect dominates;, if inequality is high,
however, the distance eﬀect dominates and mobility falls. We also examine the eﬀect of
such a change on the distribution of skills and ﬁnd that the ratio of skilled to unskilled
typically rises. In a very unequal economy, however, the distance eﬀect might be strong
enough to imply that the ratio of skilled to unskilled declines.
The paper examines the eﬀect of various social and educational changes; a general
improvement in the educational system, a reduction in the barriers to education faced by
non-skilled parents and an increase in the bargaining power of parents. A common result
for all these changes is a negative correlation between inequality and upward mobility; if
a change reduces inequality, it raises upward mobility and vice versa. Returning to the
empirical ﬁndings described above, we can say that while the diﬀerence between the US
and the Nordic countries ﬁts diﬀerences in the educational systems, the diﬀerences between
the US and Italy is better attributed to productivity diﬀerences.
We also examine the eﬀect on inequality and mobility of public support to education.
Here, we reach two results. The ﬁrst is that public support to education reduces inequality
but raises upward mobility. The second is that public support to education may actually
increase inequality of opportunity, namely that children of skilled parents gain more from
public education than children of unskilled. Hence, the eﬀect on social mobility of public
support to education is mixed. While children of the poor do better in absolute terms, they
might do worse relative to children of the rich.
Our paper belongs to a recently growing literature, which embeds the issues of inequal-
ity, distribution and mobility in a general equilibrium macroeconomic framework. This
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literature has been spurred both by recent events in the world economy, namely the widen-
ing of wage gaps, and recent developments in economic research. Theoretical and empirical
research has shown that income distribution aﬀects the overall performance of the economy.
Examples of this are Loury (1981), Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993)
and Aghion and Bolton (1997) for the role of inequality and distribution, and Durlauf
(1996), Owen and Weil (1998), Maoz and Moav (1999), and Hassler and Mora (2000) for
the role of intergenerational mobility. Examples of papers that have used cross country
data to examine the eﬀect of inequality on economic growth are Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996), and Barro (2000).
There is also a growing empirical literature on intergenerational mobility, strongly re-
lated to our paper. In addition to the papers cited above, we should mention Cooper,
Durlauf and Johnson (1993) and the survey by Solon (1999). A recent empirical paper by
Rubinstein and Tsiddon (1998) provides evidence that education is not only aﬀected by
parents’ income but also by parents’ education. Another relevant paper is Dynarski (2000).
It shows that recently enacted U.S. programs that provide non-means-tested tuition subsi-
dies, have increased the diﬀerences in college attendance rates between students from high-
and low-income families, i.e., increasing inequality of opportunity, using our terminology.
This conforms with our model results.
Here, we should again mention Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999) who, in addition
to the empirical comparison between Italy and the US, present a model of inequality and
mobility to account for these results. Our model diﬀers signiﬁcantly from theirs, both in
structure and results. We show that the diﬀerence between Italy and the US cannot be
attributed to the public education system, as they claim. Furthermore, our model has a
wider goal as it oﬀers a general model to study the joint determination of inequality and
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mobility and how these diﬀer across countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of inequality and
mobility. Section 3 analyzes equilibrium and steady state with exogenous and endogenous
wages, respectively. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of a skill biased technical change. Section
5 analyzes the eﬀects of various social and educational changes. Section 6 discusses the eﬀect
of public support to education and Section 7 the eﬀect of redistributive policy. Section 8
analyzes the eﬀect of social norms and Section 9 concludes.
Let us now describe our basic model. We assume that individuals live for two periods,
consuming and inelastically supplying one unit of labor only in the second period of their
life. In the ﬁrst period, the individual chooses whether to become skilled (type s) or non-
skilled (type n). Skilled workers earn more than unskilled workers, namely ws > wn, where
wj is the wage of type j s, n expressed in terms of output. To become skilled, agents
need to learn, which is costly. To ﬁnance learning, a child needs the support of her parents.
The reliance on parents is motivated by diﬃculties in borrowing against future human
capital but also by our belief that parents play a crucial role in the learning process that
cannot be perfectly substituted for by capital markets.
Individuals are born with diﬀerent aptitudes for learning. We measure this aptitude by
the index e, which is assumed to be drawn from a rectangular distribution over the unit
interval and distributed i.i.d. across generations. To become skilled, a cost that falls in
e must be paid. In other words, the lower the aptitude of the child, the more the parents
must pay in order for their child to succeed at school and become skilled. We think of this
cost as representing direct schooling costs like tuition, but also more indirect costs such as
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tutoring and providing a good home environment. We assume education is produced using
skilled labor, implying that the cost of education is proportional to the skilled wage. For
j s, n denoting parental education, we assume that a child with aptitude e can become
skilled if the amount spent on education ı satisﬁes
ı
1 e
dj
ws, (1)
where dj represents the parental educational productivity and
1−e
dj
should be interpreted
as the required teacher time.1 In line with the empirical evidence, such as in Rubinstein
and Tsiddon (1998), we allow the educational productivity to vary with parental education
level. We assume that ds dn > 0, capturing the fact that skilled people (because they
are educated) have more knowledge about how to eﬃciently educate a child. Associated
with the decision on how much to spend on the childrens education are decisions on how
to allocate these spending. For example, educating a child requires allocation of resources
for buying books, but also which books to buy.2
We assume away capital markets, so children cannot borrow against future income
and parental consumption is therefore equal to income net of taxes and transfers minus
1 It is straightforward to allow non-constant returns to scale in education by setting 1 − e ≤
αwj
ws
γ
dj
with γ smaller or larger than unity.
2The diﬀerences in educational productivies can be modeled in an explicit way. Assume that the produc-
tivity of resources spent on education is (proportional to) e−
1
2
(x−a)2where x is the best action and a is the ac-
tual action. The best action x is unknown but known to everyone to be normally distributed with mean µ and
a variance σ. The expected return on educational expentitures is then E e−
1
2
(x−µ)2 = 1 + σ2
−1/2
≡ dn.
Suppose also that skilled parents receive a signal on the realization of x, normally distributed, unbiased
and with precision P . Then, for skilled parents E e−
1
2
(x−µ)2 = 1+σ
2(1+P )
1+Pσ2
−1/2
≡ ds > dn. Finally,
assuming, realistically, that eduation entails a large number of such deicsions and using the law-of-large
numbers, implies that the return on educational expenditures becomes non-stochastic and larger for skilled
parents.
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educational investments.
Each individual receives one child in the second period of life and parents are altruis-
tically linked to their children in a standard dynastic chain. Assuming logarithmic utility,
the objective function of an old individual is
ln(c) + βEU, (2)
where EU is the expected utility of her child and β [0, 1) is the intergenerational discount
factor. Without loss of generality, we assume that the individual discount factor between
two periods of life is unity.
Assuming zero population growth, we normalize the size of each generation to unity
and denote the amount of unskilled individuals in period t by Nt. Hence, the amount of
skilled individuals is 1 Nt.
We next present the production side of the economy, where we consider two cases;
exogenous and endogenous wages. In the ﬁrst case, productivity and wages of both types
of workers are ﬁxed and do not depend on the amount of workers of each type. In this case
ws and wn are ﬁxed and do not change over time. In the second case, we assume that there
is a competitive labor market where wages are given by marginal productivities.
Regarding our informational assumptions, we assume as the main case that the educa-
tional investment decision is taken after the child’s aptitude has been revealed. We also
analyze the case of no information about individual aptitudes when the educational invest-
ment decision is taken. In the appendix, we consider an intermediate case, where parent
and child receive an imperfect signal on individual aptitude before the educational decision
is made.
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This section describes the equilibrium of the model without government. The analysis of
subsidies to education and redistributive taxation is deferred to Sections 6 and 7. We ﬁrst
deal with the case of exogenous wages and then turn to endogenous wages.
3.1 Exogenous wages
We begin the analysis by studying the decision of investment in education. We assume that
the aptitude is fully revealed to both parent and child at ﬁrst period of life. As explained
above, a parent of type j with a child with aptitude e has to pay an amount (1 e) /dj
for her child to become skilled. However, parents will only be willing to pay this amount
if their welfare, including the altruistic concern of their children, does not decrease if their
child becomes skilled, i.e., if
ln (wj ι) + βVs lnwj + βVn, (3)
where Vj denotes the expected utility of an individual of skill type j, before knowing the
aptitude of her oﬀspring, namely in the ﬁrst period of life. In order to ﬁnd the maximum
share of income, which a parent will pay to ﬁnance education for her child, we set the RHS
equal to the LHS and get
β(Vs Vn) = ln(1 α) E(α), (4)
where α is the maximum share of income spent on education. Clearly, (4) deﬁnes a unique
investment ratio α [0, 1), which is an increasing function of the expected utility diﬀerence,
but independent of wage and educational productivity and, hence, of parental type. Given
the type independent choice of α, children with parents of type j with an aptitude e
1 αdjwj ej will become skilled. In contrast to α, the threshold aptitude ej depends on
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type. The share of children with skilled parents who themselves become skilled is
1 es = α ds, (5)
while the share of children of unskilled parents who move upwards and become skilled is
1 en = α
dn
I
, (6)
where I ws/wn denotes wage inequality. Note that 1 en, which measures upward
mobility in the economy, increases in α and decreases in I.
A variable that captures another aspect of mobility is inequality of opportunity, which
we deﬁne as
en es = α ds
dn
I
. (7)
Inequality of opportunity measures the diﬀerence due to background between children
of skilled and unskilled parents. It reﬂects both diﬀerent levels of income and diﬀerent
productivities of education. We should note that if at least some individuals become skilled
(α > 0), inequality of opportunity is positive whenever ds > dn and/or I > 1.
Now, we can calculate the expected utility3
Vj = (1 ej)
α+ ln(1 α)
α
+ lnwj + βVn (8)
3To get this, note that
Vj =
1
ej
ln(1−
(1− e)ws
djwj
)de+ lnwj + βVn + β (1− ej) (Vs − Vn)
=
wjdj
ws
α
0
ln(1− x)dx+ lnwj + βVn + β (1− ej) (Vs − Vn)
=
wjdj
ws
((α− 1) ln(1− α)− α) + lnwj + βVn − (1− ej)
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implying that
β (Vs Vn) = β ln I (en es)
ln(1 α) + α
α
(9)
= β ln I ds
dn
I
(ln(1 α) + α) ∆V (α)
with ∂∆V (α)∂α = β ds
dn
I
α
1−α > 0. Note that the welfare diﬀerence between skilled and
non-skilled does not only depend on wage inequality, but also on inequality of opportunity.
Since parents care about their children, a larger inequality of opportunity leads to larger
welfare diﬀerences. As we see, welfare diﬀerences are aﬀected by the diﬀerence (en es),
rather than, for example, the ratio of the thresholds. Therefore it appears natural to use
the diﬀerence as the metric of inequality of opportunity.4 ,5
Equation (9) deﬁnes the welfare diﬀerence between skilled and non-skilled as a function
of investment shares and wage inequality. Together, (4) and (9) deﬁne a unique equilibrium
investment share and a welfare diﬀerence as a function of wage inequality. This equilibrium
is depicted in Figure 1, where the steeper curve, starting at 0, represents (4) and the
curve with an intercept is (9). The intercept of the latter equals β ln I, implying that in
equilibrium, α 0, and is equal to zero only if I = 1.
The maximum share of income invested in education, α, is determined by the intersec-
4 It should also be noted that when ds > dn, en−es = (1− es) 1−
dn
ds
> 0, is eﬃcient in the sense that
costs of education for the marginal individual from skilled and non-skilled homes, respectively, are equalized.
5 In reality, other variables than parental education, income and innate ability may, of course, aﬀect
individual outcomes. In empirical implementations, these factors would be incorporated in an error term.
In an early paper, Conlisk (1974) notes that the reduction of the variance of such an error term also can
be thought of as equalization of opportunity. More importantly, such equalization may, in fact, increase the
correlation between parental and child income or education and reduce intergenerational mobility.
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tion of the E(α) and the ∆V (α) curves described in Figure 1, satisfying
ln(1 α) = β ln I ds
dn
I
(ln(1 α) + α) . (10)
Clearly, an increase in wage inequality I, shifts the ∆V (α) curve upwards, i.e., the
additional value of being skilled rather than non-skilled increases for every value of α. The
intersection with the E(α) curve therefore occurs at a higher level of α. The relation between
investment shares and inequality, deﬁned by the above equation, is denoted α = IN(I) and
we call it the equilibrium investment curve. It is straightforward to show that IN(I) is
monotonically increasing but bounded below unity; as inequality increases, the maximum
share of income spent on education increases. At I = 1, α = 0 and dIN(I)dI = β while as I
goes to inﬁnity α approaches unity.6
6The LHS of (12) starts at zero with a slope 1
1−α
, while the RHS starts at β ln I > 0 with a slope
(ds − dn/I)
α
1−α
< 1
1−α
. As α approaches unity, the ratio of the LHS and the RHS is 1
β(ds− dnI )
> 1.
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We can now conclude that inequality has two eﬀects on upward mobility (1 en) =
αdn/I. There is a direct negative eﬀect because the ability of unskilled parents to supply
education to their children does not only depend on their own wage, but also on the wage
of skilled workers. This is due to our assumption that educational services are produced by
skilled workers and hence, education costs are indexed by ws. We call this negative relation
between inequality and upward mobility the distance eﬀect. The other eﬀect works through
the response of α. As inequality increases, the value of becoming educated increases, so α
increases. This raises upward mobility and we call it the incentive eﬀect. This eﬀect is due
to the fact that parents care about the future welfare of their oﬀspring and its strength
therefore increases in the intergenerational discount factor. When inequality is suﬃciently
low, the incentive eﬀect dominates. For example, at I = 1, we have α = 0 and as a result,
the eﬀect of inequality on upward mobility is given by: d(1−en)dI I=1 = dn
dα
dI I=1 = dnβ.
However, due to the fact that α is bounded below unity, the distance eﬀect will eventually
dominate.
In contrast to upward mobility, downward mobility and inequality of opportunity are
monotonically related to inequality. Downward mobility decreases in inequality, while in-
equality of opportunity increases. Inequality has a direct positive eﬀect on inequality of
opportunity. In addition, the induced increase in α further exacerbates the increase.
3.2 Endogenous wages
Let us now endogenize wages. When wages and utility diﬀerences are no longer constant,
the above derivation of the maximum share of income invested in education is analytically
cumbersome. In order to keep the analysis tractable, we therefore limit our discussion to
the steady state of the economy. In the steady state, the above calculation of the relations
between inequality, welfare and maximum investment shares, which are summarized by the
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function α = IN(I), remains valid. However, it should be kept in mind that comparative
statics analysis below is done across diﬀerent steady states. Therefore, it is only suitable
for cross-sectional analysis.
Wages will be determined on the competitive labor market. For simplicity, we assume
that skilled workers can be used with a linear technology implying that ws is independent of
the supply of skilled. Non-skilled workers, on the other hand, have to work with a decreasing
returns-to-scale technology. Therefore, their wage depends on the supply of non-skilled;7
wn = anN
−σ, (11)
with 0 < σ < 1 and inequality is given by
I = aNσ, (12)
where a wsan
1/σ is assumed to be larger than unity to ensure interior equilibria. By
inverting this relation, we can express the ratio of skilled to non-skilled as a downward
sloping convex function of inequality;
1 N
N
= S(I; a) aI−
1
σ 1. (13)
In a steady state, the downward and upward intergenerational ﬂows must balance, which
leads to the following steady-state condition
1 en
es
= S(I; a). (14)
7For simplicity, proﬁts arising in this sector are assumed to be distributed to individuals in proportion
to their income. This can be motivated by ownership of a ﬁxed factor, complementary to non-skilled labor
(land), being proportional to income. It is straighforward to show that the distribution of proﬁts in this
way has no consequence for the analyzis and is therefore discarded.
15
I n
e
I
IN I
LM I ( )
n
LM I
d
I
( )
n
IN I
d
I
Figure 2:
Substituting (5) and (6) in the steady state condition, we derive a second equilibrium
relationship between the maximum investment share α and wage inequality I:
α =
IS(I; a)
dn + dsIS(I; a)
LM (I) . (15)
The equation α = LM(I) provides a negative relation between α and I, which we call
the labor market equilibrium curve. The reason why this curve is downward sloping can
be explained in the following way. An increase in S, decreases inequality since the marginal
productivity of unskilled increases. The direct eﬀect of this on 1−enes is positive since (1 en)
depends positively on I due to the distance eﬀect. However, the direct eﬀect is not suﬃcient
to restore equality and α therefore has to increase.
The curves α = IN(I) and α = LM(I) have a unique intersection point, which de-
termines the equilibrium under endogenous wages, as depicted in the left-hand panel of
Figure 2. The same equilibrium is described in the right panel of the ﬁgure, but in terms of
upward mobility, i.e., using the fact that 1 en = αdn/I. From the labor market condition,
α = LM(I), we get
1 en =
S(I; a)
1 + dsdn IS(I; a)
, (16)
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which describes a negative relation between upward mobility and inequality. The other
curve is derived from parents’ decisions on education and is (1 en) = IN(I)dn/I. This
is a hump shaped curve, reﬂecting the dominant incentive eﬀect for low inequality and the
dominant distance eﬀect for high inequality, as discussed in the previous subsection.
Skill biased technical change and its eﬀect have been at the center of recent discussions
on wage inequality and skill distribution. In this section, we use our model to analyze the
equilibrium responses to exogenous changes in the relative productivity of skilled.
Consider an increase in a, representing skill-biased technical change. From the deﬁnition
of the α = LM(I) curve, it follows that such an increase shifts it upwards, while having
no eﬀect on the curve α = IN(I). Hence, inequality and the share of income spent on
education always increase. However, since the investment curve is bounded below unity,
increases in the relative productivity of the skilled must eventually lead to smaller and
smaller increases in the investment share. This is shown in the upper left panel of ﬁgure 3.
In the upper right panel, we see that upward mobility increases when 1 en = dnIN(I)/I
is upward sloping, i.e., when inequality is low enough to make the incentive eﬀect dominate.
Eventually, however, the distance eﬀect must dominate and then further increases in the
relative productivity of the skilled lead to reductions in upward mobility. Hence, in a
relatively equal economy, skill biased technical change increases upward mobility, while in
a relatively unequal society, it is reduced.
The eﬀect of skill biased technical change on skill distribution, namely on the ratio of
skilled to unskilled workers, is ambiguous, since it rises with a and falls with I. It can be
shown that as long as upward mobility rises, S increases as well. At high levels of inequality,
17
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however, it is possible that S is reduced, due to the distance eﬀect. Despite the fact that
demand for skilled labor increases, the relative amount of skilled workers falls, since access
to education for children of unskilled is suﬃciently reduced. This result can shed light on
some recent ﬁndings on reductions in relative supplies of skill together with the increase in
wage inequality, as in Card and Lemieux (1999).
We can also evaluate how the equilibrium diﬀerence in individual welfare responds to
the change in a. From (4), we know that the equilibrium diﬀerence in welfare is positively
related to the investment share. Thus, an increase in a increases the diﬀerence in welfare
between the skilled and the non-skilled. Note that this is due to two factors. First, wage
inequality increases. Second, en es = α (ds dn/I) increases, i.e., inequality of opportu-
nity also increases. In other words, the importance of social background for welfare and
the probability of becoming skilled increases.
In this section, we turn to the eﬀects of changes in the productivity of education, which
is measured by ds and dn. We ﬁrst examine the following change in the economy: both
ds and dn rise by the same proportion, so that their ratio remains unchanged. Next, we
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consider the eﬀect of an increase in dn only, namely what happens if the cultural barrier to
education faced by unskilled parents is reduced.
5.1 Better Education to All
A proportional increase in ds and dn means that the investment in education of both
skilled and unskilled parents becomes more eﬀective, but the relative eﬀectiveness remains
unchanged. Such a change leaves the curve E(α) unchanged, while there is an upward
shift in the curve ∆V (α). Hence, holding wages ﬁxed, the maximum share of educational
spending α increases, i.e., the curve α = IN(I) shifts upwards. Thus, 1 es and 1 en rise
by the same proportion and inequality of opportunity increases.
If wages are endogenous, greater investments in education and greater productivity of
education lead to lower inequality, as can be seen in Figure 2. As noted, the α = IN(I)
curve shifts upwards, while the α = LM(I) curve shifts downwards. Hence, inequality
I declines, while the eﬀect on the share α is ambiguous. The long-run eﬀect on upward
mobility is, however, clear. The curve 1 en = dnIN(I)/I shifts up, while the curve
1 en = dnLM(I)/I remains unchanged. Hence inequality falls, while upward mobility
increases. We therefore conclude that general changes in the productivity of education lead
to a negative correlation between inequality and mobility.
5.2 Smaller Cultural Barriers to Education
Consider now an increase in dn only. Namely, the productivity of supplying education
rises for unskilled parents, while it remains unchanged for skilled parents. We ﬁrst analyze
the eﬀect of this change with exogenous wages. The rise in dn shifts the ∆V (α) curve
downwards, reducing α. As a result, es and downward mobility increase. The reason for
these changes is that as dn increases, the relative value of becoming skilled is reduced, since
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it is no longer so bad to be unskilled, as the child of an unskilled can more easily move up
the social ladder. The resulting negative incentive eﬀect reduces α and increases es. The
reduction in α also increases en, but there is a distance eﬀect in the opposite direction,
since the ability of non-skilled parents to provide education to their children increases with
dn. Using equation (10), we ﬁnd that despite the decline in α, dnα still increases with dn,
i.e., the distance eﬀect dominates.8 Hence, when wages are exogenous, a reduction in the
barrier to education for children of unskilled parents increases upward mobility. Clearly,
inequality of opportunity falls.
When wages are endogenous, the results are more ambiguous, as we have to account
for changes in inequality as well. As noted, the increase in dn shifts the α = IN(I) curve
downwards, while 1 en = dnIN(I)/I shifts upwards. As for the labor market curves,
it is straightforward to see that the α = LM(I) curve shifts down and to the left, while
1 en = dnLM(I)/I shifts up and to the right. The intuition behind these shifts is as
follows. When α is held ﬁxed and dn increases there is more upward mobility. As a result,
there are more skilled and wage inequality falls. Hence, the LM curve shifts to the left.
If, on the contrary, 1 en is kept unchanged and dn increases, that is possible only if
the maximum spending on education, α, declines. This means that downward mobility
increases. As a result, there are less skilled workers and wage inequality rises. Hence, the
upward mobility curve shifts to the right.
The downward shifts in the α = IN(I) and α = LM(I) curves imply that α must fall.
The eﬀect on inequality I is not clear from this ﬁgure. However, we can show that unless
α is too large to begin with, inequality must decrease as dn increases.
9 In that case, it is
8The elasticity dα
ddn
dn
α
is given by dn
I
1
1
βα
−(ds− dnI )
1−α
α
ln(1−α)+α
α
where dn
I
< 1, 1
1
βα
−(ds− dnI )
< 1 and
1−α
α
ln(1−α)+α
α
∈ [− 1
2
, 0]. Since the elasticity is larger than -1, adn increases in dn.
9 In appendix 10.1, we show that inequality necessarily falls in dn as long as α < 0.68.
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clear that an increase in dn increases upward mobility, 1 en.
We have found that an improvement in the productivity of education for children of
unskilled parents leads to a negative correlation between inequality and upward mobility:
inequality falls and upward mobility rises. The eﬀect on inequality of opportunity in this
case is clear-cut — it falls as a result of lower cultural barriers to education for children of
unskilled parents.
We conclude the analysis in this section by noting that changes in the productivity of
education, or in the educational system, whether they favor all or only the unskilled, all
lead to a negative correlation between inequality and mobility. This once more takes us
to the empirical ﬁndings of Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999), who ﬁnd that the U.S.
is less equal but more mobile than Italy. According to our results, this cannot be due to
diﬀerences in education between the US and Italy, as the authors claim. According to our
model, the diﬀerence can be attributed to a technological diﬀerence in a, namely in the
relative productivity of skilled and unskilled. Another possibility that might be considered
is that Italy has signiﬁcant wage compression, due to strong unions, which reduces inequality
I, even without changing productivity. We could interpret a lower value of a in Italy as
reﬂecting higher wage compression. This can explain not only why Italy is more equal than
the US, but also why it is less mobile, since lower inequality reduces mobility through the
incentive eﬀect.
This section describes changes in education without introducing public support for
education. But most of the international diﬀerences in educational systems are due to
diﬀerent degrees of public support to education. Thus for example, large parts of education
in the US are still privately ﬁnanced, while public support for education in Europe is more
widespread. Next, we wish to see how such diﬀerences in education aﬀect inequality and
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mobility. The next section therefore examines the eﬀects of subsidization of education on
inequality and mobility.
In this section, we examine the eﬀects of educational subsidies. We focus on policies aiming
at increasing the share of children who become skilled by subsidizing education costs. Un-
like, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), we do not assume that public education
rules out private spending on education. Instead, we assume that parents are free to add
to what the government provides. A key element in the analysis will, therefore, be the
endogeneity of private expenditures.
In principle, we may distinguish between subsidies in kind, i.e., provision of public
schools, and subsidies reducing the cost of education, for example tuition reductions or
student loans. In our stylized model, however, such a distinction is not very meaningful
since in both cases, we would eﬀectively model such policy as changes in the educational
productivity parameters dj , as executed in the previous section. In contrast to the analysis
in the previous section, however, we now take into account that increases in subsidies
to education must be ﬁnanced. All along, we assume ﬁnancing to be achieved with a
proportional income tax.
We now consider the case when public education is a perfect substitute to private
education. Speciﬁcally, we assume educational costs to be as in the basic model, but are
partly subsidized by the government.10 The size of the subsidy is πws for every student,
and ﬁnanced by a proportional tax of rate T. Hence, the education thresholds are
ej = 1
αwj(1 T ) + πws
ws
dj. (17)
10The alternative, when public subsidies are complements to private education, is analyzed in appendix.
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The E(α) curve, relating the threshold α to the utility diﬀerence, remains unchanged,
i.e., β(Vs Vn) = ln(1 α), since a proportional tax has the same additive impact on
utility for skilled and non-skilled.
Solving for the expected utility levels, we ﬁnd that
∆V (α) = β ln I ds
dn
I
(1 T ) (ln(1 α) + α) (ds dn)π ln(1 α) .
Clearly, ∆V (α) rotates clockwise, shifting downwards for α > 0, as T increases, since
taxes reduce inequality of opportunity. On the other hand, ∆V (α) increases in π if ds > dn,
since skilled parents are in a better position to take advantage of the public subsidy.11 To
ﬁnd the combined eﬀect, we use the steady state government budget constraint. This can
be written T (ws(1 N) +wnN) = πws(1 N) implying π = T (1 + IS(I))/IS(I).
12
For low levels of inequality and provided ds > dn, the positive direct eﬀect dominates
and public subsidies shift ∆V (α) upwards. In that range, the α = IN (I) curve shifts up,
i.e., the incentive for education is strengthened. For higher levels of inequality, however, the
eﬀect through taxes become stronger and the sum of the eﬀects is then of ambiguous sign.
Clearly, if ds dn is small, the negative tax eﬀect is more likely to dominate and α = IN (I)
curve then shifts down.
11 It should be noted that the positve eﬀect on ∆V is larger in the case when subsidies complement private
spending as, for example, when subsidies are given in the form of proportional reductions in tuition. See
appendix.
12For convenience, we assume the government is unable to observe individual aptitude, therefore spending
πws on all children who become skilled. Note also that we used the endogenous wage equilibrium condition
(1−N)/N = S(I) to derive the relation between π and T. This implies that in contrast to the case in section
3.1 the IN(I) curve can no longer be interpreted as a function of an exogenous wage inequality.
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Next, we consider upward mobility, 1 en. The condition∆V (α) = E(α) can be written
ln 1
1 en
dn
π
I (1 + IS(I))
1 + IS(I) (1 π)
=
β ln I β (dsI dn)
1−en
dn
π
1 β(ds dn)π β ds
dn
I
1+IS(I)(1−π)
1+IS(I)
,
deﬁning a curve relating upward mobility and inequality. It can be shown that when
the subsidy increases, this curve shifts upward. The interpretation of this is that holding
inequality constant, educational subsidies will crowd out private expenditures less than
one-for-one.
The second condition is derived from the labor market equilibrium, equating the ﬂows
of upward and downward mobility. It is straightforward to show that this condition can be
written
1 en =
S(I) + dsS(I)(I 1)π
1 + dsdn IS(I)
,
deﬁning a negative relation between upward mobility and inequality that shifts upward in
π. When inequality low, (I close to unity), this labor market equilibrium curve becomes
independent of π. Thus, if inequality is relatively low, inequality will fall with increases
in the subsidy. We therefore conclude that changes in the degree of subsidization to the
educational system lead to a negative correlation between inequality and mobility, at least
in a relatively equal economy.
Considering, ﬁnally, inequality of opportunity, given by
en es = α(1 T ) (ds dn/I) + π (ds dn) , (18)
we see that it is aﬀected by educational subsidies through several channels. First, there
is the direct eﬀect, which increases inequality of opportunity if ds > dn. Second, ﬁnanc-
ing subsidies through proportional taxes reduces inequality of opportunity by weakening
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the distance eﬀect. Third, educational subsidies change the incentive for education and
therefore the share of income parents are willing to spend on education. In general, the
eﬀect on α is ambiguous but for low levels of inequality and if the advantage of skilled
parents ds dn is large, α may increase leading to larger inequality of opportunity. Finally,
wage inequality is aﬀected by educational policies and to the extent that wage inequality
is reduced, inequality of opportunity is reduced through the distance eﬀect.
Suppose now that the government uses income taxes to ﬁnance a ﬁxed subsidy of size τws
to each household. This may be interpreted as a redistributive transfer system or subsidies
to basic education that everyone participates in. Disposable income for a household of type
j then becomes
ws
wj
ws
(1 T ) + τ
and the aptitude thresholds become
ej = 1 α
wj
ws
(1 T ) + τ dj.
Again, we ﬁnd that the curve E(α) is unaﬀected by T and τ . The utility diﬀerence for
given wage inequality ∆V (α) is
= β ln Id (1 T + τ) ds
dn
Id
(ln(1 α) + α) , (19)
where
Id
1 T + τ
1−T
I + τ
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denotes disposable income inequality. Using the government budget constraint, T (Nwn +
(1 N)ws) = τws, we get
τ = T
1 + IS(I)
I + IS(I)
< T.
This implies that (1 T+τ) falls, while 1−TI +τ increases, and hence Id falls in T . Thus,
∆V (α) shifts downwards as T is increased, implying that the equilibrium curve α = IN(I)
shifts downwards. This is due to the fact that the progressive nature of the tax-transfer
system reduces the incentives to become educated. Clearly, given I, the utility diﬀerence
and the inequality of opportunity
α (1 T + τ) ds
dn
Id
,
fall. This policy increases downward mobility, while its eﬀect on upward mobility
1 en = α (1 T + τ)
dn
Id
is ambiguous, since the incentive eﬀect and the distance eﬀect push in opposite directions.
It should be noted that for any I, a suﬃciently high level of redistribution must increase
en, since increasing redistribution eventually leads to Id = 1 and then α = 0 and en = 1.
The LM(I) curve, which can be written as
α =
IS (I)
dn + dsIS (I) (ds dn)
TS(I)(I−1)
1+S
,
shifts upwards and to the right with T, since I > 1 and ds > dn, as illustrated in ﬁgure
4. The reason for the shift is that when ds > dn redistribution implies that for a given
α, money will be less eﬃciently spent on education. As a result, fewer individuals become
skilled, increasing wage inequality I. Hence, the curve shifts to the right. From the shifts
of the two curves, we can conclude that the tax-transfer system necessarily increases I.
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Figure 4:
Furthermore, if dn is close to ds and inequality is high, the shift in the ∆V (α) dominates
so that α falls, in which case inequality of opportunity must decrease.
The curve 1 en = LM(I)dn
1−T
I + τ can be written as
1 en =
S (I)
1 + dsdn
(1+S(I))IS(I)−T (I−1)S(I)
1+S(I)+T (I−1)S(I)
,
which clearly shifts upward with T , while the eﬀect on the curve 1 en = IN(I)dn
1−T
I + τ is
indeterminate. However, if inequality is low the latter curve shifts downward. The conclu-
sion is that redistribution increases wage inequality, while its eﬀect on upward mobility is
ambiguous.
In the analysis above, we have assumed that educational aptitude is revealed before the
educational decision is taken. In this section, we reverse this assumption and assume
that educational decisions must be taken before aptitude is revealed. Most of the results
discussed above turn out to be insensitive to this change in assumption. However, one
qualitative diﬀerence arises. The resolution of the conﬂict of interest between parents and
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children now depends on their relative bargaining strength, which therefore becomes a
relevant variable in the model. Thus, we can study the consequences of cultural diﬀerences
in family traditions across countries.
When aptitude is unknown, the child strictly prefers more spending to less since her
chances of becoming skilled strictly increase in educational spending. The parent shares
this interest with the child, but also cares about her own consumption. We assume that
the level of educational spending is determined in an asymmetric Nash bargaining, where
the threat of the parent is to pay nothing to the child, who then becomes non-skilled, while
the threat of the child is to refuse to go to school. The bargaining power of the parent is
parameterized by p [0, 1].13
We assume that early in a child’s education, it is revealed whether the investment is
suﬃcient for the child to complete school. If not, the child can quit school, become non-
skilled and investment cost is saved. Hence, parents’ expected utility levels at the time of
bargaining with their children are given by
lnwj + βVn + (1 ej) (ln (1 αj) + β (Vs Vn)) , (20)
where 1 ej =
αjwj
ws
dj, is the probability that a child with parents of type j, who invest
αjwj in education, becomes skilled. Children with parents of type j have expected utility
levels of
Vn + (1 ej) (Vs Vn).
Noting that the threat points are lnwj+βVn and Vn for parents and children respectively,
13When aptitude is known, parents pay the required amount for their childrens’ education provided their
is a non-negative surplus from doing so. Thus, the outcome is independent of individual bargaining strength.
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the logarithm of the Nash-product is
ln (1 ej) + p ln [ln(1 αj) + β (Vs Vn)] + (1 p) ln(Vs Vn). (21)
The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing (21) over αj is independent of j and hence, can
be written in terms of a share α, which is the same for skilled and unskilled parents:
β (Vs Vn) = p
α
1 α
ln (1 α) FOC(α). (22)
Clearly, (22) deﬁnes a unique investment ratio α [0, 1], which is an increasing function
of the expected utility diﬀerence, but independent of wage and educational productivity. As
above, there is a positive relation between educational investment and the future welfare
diﬀerence between the skilled and the non-skilled. The strength of the incentive eﬀect
decreases with parental bargaining power.
Next, we calculate the utility diﬀerence between skilled and non-skilled individuals when
educational investments are chosen optimally. Substituting (22) in equation (20) yields,
Vj = lnwn + βVn + (1 ej)
p
γ
α
1 α
,
implying
β (Vs Vn) = β ln I + ds
dn
I
p
α2
1 α
∆V (α). (23)
Note that the utility diﬀerence between skilled and non-skilled individuals depends not
only on wage inequality, but on the inequality of opportunity as well, since parents care
about their children. Together, (22) and (23) deﬁne a unique investment share function of
wage inequality. This function is increasing, just as the IN(I) function in the main model.
It also leads to similar incentive and distance eﬀects.
Combining the IN function in this case with the LM function, which is the same
as in the main model, we derive equilibrium in a similar way. The main diﬀerence is
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that it enables us to analyze the consequences of diﬀerences in parental bargaining power.
This variable reﬂects family traditions and values in the society, which may diﬀer across
countries. Consider a country with a higher value of p. It can be shown that an increase in
p reduces α for any level of inequality. The intuitive reason for this result is that parents
have more power and can aﬀord more consumption, hence investing less in the education
of their children. Hence, downward mobility is increased, upward mobility is reduced and
inequality of opportunity falls as p increases.
Endogenizing wages, by requiring α = LM(I) (which is independent of p), we ﬁnd that
net downward mobility created by the increase in p increases the number of non-skilled
workers and reduces the number of skilled workers. By drawing a ﬁgure similar to ﬁgure 2,
this is straightforward since the relation between α and I (the equivalent to the α = IN(I)
curve) shifts downwards, while the LM(I) curve remains unchanged. Hence, I rises as
α and upward mobility (1 en) fall. In this case, like in most cases of changes in the
educational system analyzed above, we also get a negative correlation between inequality
and upward mobility.
In this paper, we construct a model where wage and welfare inequality, intergenerational
mobility and skill distribution are all endogenously determined in a general equilibrium
framework. The model leads us to a number of important insights that may help un-
derstanding both empirical regularities and policy implications. One insight is that wage
inequality has two eﬀects on upward mobility, the incentive eﬀect and the distance eﬀect.
The distance eﬀect and its interaction with the incentive eﬀect play an important role in
this paper. While the incentive eﬀect is straightforward, the distance eﬀect needs some
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discussion. We have assumed educational costs to be indexed to the wages of the skilled,
motivated by the fact that labor input in education (teachers) largely consists of skilled
workers. Hence, even if the wages of unskilled remain unchanged as the wages of the skilled
rise, the distance eﬀect would imply a negative eﬀect on upward mobility. If, on the other
hand, educational costs were indexed to non-skilled wages, the increase in skilled wages
would reduce downward mobility while leaving upward mobility constant. Thus, in both
cases, the distance eﬀect causes a positive relation between wage inequality and inequality
of opportunity.
Our model provides an explanation why countries diﬀer with respect to inequality and
mobility. We show that diﬀerences in the degree to which technology is skill-biased lead to
positive correlation between inequality and mobility, while diﬀerences in education systems
tend to lead to negative correlation between inequality and mobility. Thus, the empirical
ﬁnding of Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999), that US is more unequal but also more
upward mobile than Italy, cannot be attributed to diﬀerences in educational systems, as
they claim. Instead our model implies that it is either an indication that the US is more
technologically skill-biased than Italy, or that Italy has less competitive labor markets with
signiﬁcant wage compression. The ﬁndings of Bjorklund, Eriksson, Jantti, Raaum and
Osterbacka (2001), that the Nordic countries are more socially mobile than the US, in
addition to being more equal, can be interpreted as an indication that public education is
more extensive in these countries than in the US.
Another interesting result of our model is that general educational subsidies are likely to
be eﬀective in increasing the supply of skilled individuals in the economy, thereby reducing
skill premia and wage inequality. If, however, an aim of such a policy is to reduce inequality
of opportunity and make social background less important for lifetime outcomes, it is likely
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to be less eﬀective. If educated parents have a better ability to make the best use of the
educational subsidy, children of educated parents beneﬁt more than other children from
public support to education. The increase in inequality of opportunity may increase welfare
diﬀerences between children from skilled and non-skilled homes also if the policy reduces
wage inequality.
Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (1997), ‘A theory of trickle-down growth and development’,
Review of Economic Studies 64(2), 151—72.
Alesina, A. and Rodrik, D. (1994), ‘Distributive politics and economic growth’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109(2), 465—90.
Banerjee, A. and Newman, A. (1993), ‘Occupational choice and the process of development’,
Journal of Political Economy 101(2), 274—298.
Barro, R. J. (2000), ‘Inequality and growth in a panel of countries’, Journal of Economic
Growth 5(1), 5—32.
Bjorklund, A., Eriksson, T., Jantti, M., Raaum, O. and Osterbacka, E. (2001), Brother
correlations in earnings in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden compared to the
United States.
Card, D. and Lemieux, T. (1999), Can falling supply explain the rising return to college
for younger men? a cohort-based analysis, Mimeo, University of California, Berkely.
32
Checchi, D., Ichino, A. and Rustichini, A. (1999), ‘More equal but less mobile? education
ﬁnancing and intergenerational mobility in Italy and in the U.S.’, Journal of Public
Economics 74(3), 351—93.
Conlisk, J. (1974), ‘Can equalization of opportunity reduce social mobility?’, The American
Economic Review 64(1), 80—90.
Cooper, S. J., Durlauf, S. N. and Johnson, P. A. (1993), ‘On the evolution of economic
status across generations’, American Statistical Association Proceedings of Business
and Economics pp. 50—58.
Dahan, M. and Gavira, A. (1999), Sibling correlations and social mobility in Latin America,
Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper Series 395.
Durlauf, S. N. (1996), ‘A theory of persistent income inequality’, Journal of Economic
Growth 1(1), 75—94.
Dynarski, S. (2000), Hope for whom? ﬁnancial aid for the middle class and its impact on
college attendance, NBER Working paper no. 7756.
Galor, O. and Zeira, J. (1993), ‘Income distribution and macroeconomics’, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 60(1), 35—52.
Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, B. (1992), ‘Public versus private investment in human capital
endogenous growth and income inequality’, Journal of Political Economy 100(4), 813—
34.
Hassler, J. and Mora, J. V. R. (2000), ‘Intelligence, social mobility and growth’, American
Economic Review 90(4), 888—908.
33
Loury, G. C. (1981), ‘Intergenerational transfers and the distribution of earnings’, Econo-
metrica 49(4), 843—67.
Maoz, Y. D. and Moav, O. (1999), ‘Intergenerational mobility and the process of develop-
ment’, Economic Journal 109(458), 667—97.
Owen, A. L. and Weil, D. N. (1998), ‘Intergenerational earnings mobility, inequality and
growth’, Journal of Monetary Economics 41(1), 71—104.
Perotti, R. (1996), ‘Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What the data say’,
Journal of Economic Growth 1(2), 149—87.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1994), ‘Is inequality harmful for growth?’, American Eco-
nomic Review 84(3), 600—21.
Rubinstein, Y. and Tsiddon, D. (1998), Coping with technological progress: The role of
ability in making inequality so persistent, Working Paper No. 27-98 , Eitan Berglas
School, Tel Aviv University.
Solon, G. (1999), Intergenerational mobility in the labor market, Vol. Volume 3, Elsevier,
chapter 29, pp. 1761—1800. in: Handbook of labor economics.
10.1 Proof dn reduces inequality
In order to examine the eﬀect on I, we use the labor market equilibrium (15), expressed as
dn
I =
(1−dsα)S(I)
α ,+ in equation (10) and get
ln I =
1
β
ln(1 α) + ds S(I)
1
α
ds) (ln(1 α) + α) ,
= ln(1 α)
1
β
ds dsS(I) +
S(I)
α
+ (ds + S(I)ds)α S(I).
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Now, we see that the derivative of the RHS with respect to I is
S′(I)
1
α
ds) (ln(1 α) + α) 0.
Thus, as long as the RHS increases in α, dαdI > 0, and since we already know that
dα
ddn
< 0, we conclude that an increase in dn reduces inequality.
Now,
∂RHS
∂α
=
1
1 α
1
β
ds dsS(I) +
S(I)
α
+ln(1 α)
S(I)
a2
+ ds + S(I)ds,
=
1
1 α
1
β
ds +
S(I)
α
ln (1 α)
α
+
1
1 α
dsα
2
1 α
+ ds.
This is positive for suﬃciently low α since
lim
α→0
S(I)
α
ln(1 α)
α
+
1
1 α
α2ds
1 α
=
S(I)
2
> 0,
and the other terms are always positive. Furthermore, the term
ln (1 α)
α
+
1
1 α
dsα
2
1 α
>
ln (1 α)
α
+
1
1 α
α2
1 α
> 0
for α < 0, we can also ﬁnd a bound on α, ensuring that all terms remain positive.
ln (1 α)
α
+
1
1 α
dsα
2
1 α
>
ln (1 α)
α
+
1
1 α
α2
1 α
,
which is positive for α smaller than 0.683.
10.2 Imperfect information
Consider now the intermediate case to full and no information. We assume that each family
receives a signal on the aptitude of their child. The signal (with a value s) is true with
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probability π and false with probability 1 π; if the signal has no informational value, i.e.,
it is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. This assumption nests the previous models as special
cases when π is zero or unity, respectively.
Consider now a parent of type j who receives a signal s and invests a share α of its
income on education. The child will succeed if δjα 1 e, where δj dj
wj
ws
. Let Q denote
the probability of success. Then, Q (α) = π+(1 π) δjα if δjα s, andQ (α) = (1 π) δjα
if δjα < s.
Thus, assuming that the bargaining power of the parents is p, the Nash bargaining
solution is the level of α that maximizes
lnNASH(α) = lnQ (α) + p ln ((ln (1 α) + β (Vs Vn))) + (1 p) ln (Vs Vn) .
The complication here is that the function Q (α) and therefore also the Nash product
are discontinuous at α = sδ . We thus decompose the Nash product into its two continuous
parts;
M (α) = ln (π + (1 π) δα)
+p ln (ln (1 α) + β (Vs Vn)) + (1 p) ln (Vs Vn) ,
L (α) = ln ((1 π) δα)
+p ln (ln (1 α) + β (Vs Vn)) + (1 p) ln (Vs Vn) .
lnNASH(α) = M(α), if the eﬀective investment (δα) is at least as large as the signal,
and L is the one that applies if the eﬀective investment is less that the signal. Note that L
is the log Nash product in the complete uncertainty case, just scaled by (1 π).
Now, consider the function M and denote αM (δ,π) = argmaxα∈[0,α¯]M(α). If π
δβ(Vs−Vn)
p+δβ(Vs−Vn)
, M is decreasing in [0, α¯] and αM (δ,π) = 0. Otherwise, it satisﬁes ﬁrst order
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condition, i.e.,
ln (1 αM ) + β (Vs Vn) = p
αM
1 αM
1 +
π
(1 π) δαM
.
Now let us look at L. Clearly, M (α) L (α) for all α in [0, α¯] with strict inequality
if π > 0. Denote αL argmaxL(α). Since L equals 21 we know that αL satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order condition,
ln (1 αL) + β (Vs Vn) = p
αL
1 αL
.
Finally, deﬁne αˆ (δ,π) as the value of α such that the value of M equals the maximum
value of L and αˆ larger than αL. (i.e., M (αˆ (δ,π)) = L (αL)). Note that α¯ > αˆ (δ,π) >
αL > αM (δ,π) 0. Furthermore, while αM (δ,π) depends on δ and π, αL does not.
Now recall that given a value of the signal s, either αδ is larger than s and NASH(α)
M(α), or αδ is smaller than s, in which case NASH(α) L(α). Thus, at α = sδ , there is
a discrete fall in NASH(α).
Consequently, we can state that the value of α that maximizes NASH(α) is
argmax
α
Nash(α) =
αM (δ,π) if s < δαM (δ,π)
s
δ if δαM (δ,π) s δαˆ(δ,π)
αL if s > δαˆ(δ,π)
In ﬁgure 5, we can see that if the signal is smaller than δαM (δ,π) (indicating a very
apt child), the maximum of the Nash product is attained at αM . For intermediate signals
s , [δαM , δαˆ], M is decreasing, and the global maximum is attained at
s
δ . Note that for
high values of π (i.e., when the signal is true with high probability) the function M is
always decreasing, and the ﬁrst region does not exist. Finally, if the signal is larger than
δαˆ, indicating a less apt child, the value of L evaluated at its maximum is larger than the
value of M evaluated at sδ , in which case the investment share is αL.
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Figure 5:
We should note that the share of income devoted to education is a non-monotonic
function of the signal. For low values of the signal (indicating a very apt child) the share
of investment is independent of the signal and increasing in δ. Thus, skilled parents spend
a higher share of a higher income on their childrens’ education. For higher signals, the
income share spent on education increases in the signal and decreases in δ; parents invest
as much as would be necessary for the child to pass school if the signal were true. If the
signal becomes suﬃciently high, the investment share is again independent of the signal.
The parent puts all her hopes into the probability that the signal is false, investing the
same level as she would have done without any information about her child’s aptitude.
10.3 Complementary public support to education
In this section, we assume that public education is complementary to private education.14
More speciﬁcally, if the government spends πws on public education, a child with aptitude
14A subsidy in the form of a price reduction on education, like a proportional tuition reduction or subsi-
dized student loans, has eﬀects qualitatively identical to those of complementary public education. Subsidies
targeted at children from non-skilled homes have qualitatively similar eﬀects to those of increases in dn.
Details available upon request from the authors.
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e to a parent of type j, who pays a share α of income for private education, can become
skilled if
π(1 T )αwj ws
1 e
dj
, (24)
implying that the thresholds for education are ej = 1 π(1 T )αwjdj/ws.We can interpret
π as the amount of educational services provided by the government and (1 T )αwj/ws as
the amount purchased by the marginal parents.
Again, we ﬁnd that the curve E(α), as given by (4), remains unchanged and independent
of π. On the other hand, π clearly aﬀects inequality of opportunity, implying
∆V (α) = β ln I π (1 T ) ds
dn
I
(ln(1 α) + α) ,
which increases in π and falls in T .
We next wish to examine the eﬀects of changes in subsidy π on the parents’ educational
decisions. It is clear that this eﬀect depends on how π(1 T ) changes with the subsidy,
namely on the budget constraint of the government. This is given by T (wnN +ws (1 N)) =
πws (1 N). Dividing by N and wn and using the relation
1−N
N = S(I), we have T =
πIS(I)
1+IS(I) , implying
π (1 T ) = π
1 + IS(I)(1 π)
1 + IS(I)
,
which increases whenever 1 + IS(I)(1 2π) > 0.
Thus, π (1 T ) ﬁrst increases in π but will eventually fall. Below, we focus on the case
when π is low enough to imply that π (1 T ) increases in π. Then, increases in π shift
the ∆V (α) curve upwards, increasing inequality of opportunity and the utility diﬀerence
between the skilled and non-skilled for each α. Thus, equilibrium α increases for each level
of inequality. In other words, the IN(I) curve shifts upwards.
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The labor market equilibrium curve LM(I) with public education is given by
α =
1
π(1 T )
IS(I)
dn + dsIS(I)
,
which shift downwards as the subsidy to education is increased. The intuitive reason for this
shift is the following. For a given level of α, increasing the subsidy means greater spending
on education by everyone and hence, upward mobility rises and downward mobility falls.
As a result, wage inequality declines and the curve shifts to the left. However, labor market
equilibrium in terms of upward mobility
1 en = α
dnπ(1 T )
I
=
S(I)
1 + dsdn IS(I)
,
is unaﬀected by the subsidy.
The consequences of an increase in π at levels low enough to imply that also π (1 T )
increases, are illustrated in ﬁgure 6. Unambiguously, wage inequality and upward mobility
are negatively correlated, just as in all changes in Section 5. When the subsidy is small,
inequality is reduced and upward mobility rises. For suﬃciently high subsidies, the outcome
is reversed, so that inequality is increased and upward mobility reduced.
As for inequality of opportunity, described by π (1 T )α ds
dn
I , we have two con-
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ﬂicting eﬀects. The ﬁrst is due to the fact that the subsidy is more eﬀective for skilled
parents, as they invest more in private education. This eﬀect increases the inequality of
opportunity. The second eﬀect is that due to the subsidy, more individuals become skilled,
thereby reducing wage inequality. This reduces the distance eﬀect for the unskilled and
thus also inequality of opportunity. Hence, the overall eﬀect of subsidy on inequality of
opportunity is ambiguous.
We should note that the “perverse” case, when educational subsidy increases inequality
of opportunity, tends to be more likely when the diﬀerence ds dn is large. In this case, the
ability of the skilled to use subsidies to education is far greater than that of the non-skilled
and thus, a larger subsidy leads to higher inequality of opportunity .
10.4 Proportional Subsidy
Consider proportional public support to education, ﬁnanced by an income tax at a rate T .
The rate of the subsidy is g of private investment in education. Hence, private plus public
educational investments in a child with parent of type j are (1 + g)(1 T )wjα and hence,
the threshold levels of aptitude are
ej = 1 djα
(1 + g)(1 T )wj
ws
,
implying that the share of children of type j who become skilled is proportional to α.
From the previous equation, we see that the IN(I) curve shifts upwards in g if and only if
(1+g)(1 T ) increases in g. As in the case of public education, increases in g ﬁrst increases
and then decreases (1+g)(1 T ) when I is kept constant. This implies that an increase in g
from a suﬃciently low level leads to an upward shift in the IN(I) curve. The LM(I) curve
with subsidies shifts downwards, while labor market equilibrium in terms of en is unaﬀected
by the subsidy. Thus, the qualitative eﬀects of proportional subsidies are identical to those
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of complementary public education.
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